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From equality without democracy to democracy 
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east Europe
1. Introduction
More than ten years after the beginning of transition, the balance sheet of the transfor-
mation of communist societies and centrally-planned economies into liberal democra-
cies and capitalist market economies is still disputed. Some scholars put the emphasis
on the increase in political liberties and hail the prospects of economic growth stimu-
lated by privatisation and restructuring, while others focus on the enormous social
costs of economic restructuring. But there are some points on which most observers
agree, despite their different political backgrounds. One of these is that women as a
group belong to the losers in the transition, as regards their social and economic status
as well as political representation. In 1994, the American sociologist Gail Kligman
summarised the post-89 developments concerning women as:
A sharp drop in political participation of women in the public spheres of governance, an in-
creasing feminization of poverty and of refugee populations, pronounced changes in repro-
ductive policies, and a renewed emphasis on the role and responsibility of women as repro-
ducers of cultural identity.1
Even during the second half of the nineties when, in some transition countries, the
political and economic changes have been increasingly consolidated, the plight of
women has not fundamentally improved.
In this article, I trace some of the paramount aspects of increased discrimination
against women caused by the process of transformation in south-east European post-
communist countries (leaving Hungary and Moldavia out of the account). I relate
those current developments to the communist legacy as well as to the inherent logic of
capitalist restructuring. This allows us to unravel the seemingly paradoxical situation
that traditional gender roles are reinforced by a process that should, allegedly, lead to
a more modern society.
2. The communist legacy
The societies under consideration experienced almost half a century of communist
rule. One of its defining features was the ideological commitment to create equality
Democracy without women is no democracy – Slavenka Drakulić
1 Gail Kligman (1994): “Gendering the Postsocialist Transition: Women in Eastern Eu-
rope”, AAASS News Net, March, p. 1.
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between men and women, albeit by administrative fiat rather than a sustained change
in attitudes toward gender relations.
A semblance of equity which often came closer to uniformity than genuine equality was im-
posed from the top down.2
Bluntly put, south-east European communist regimes understood emancipation
mainly as the participation of women in paid employment. In order to achieve this
goal, women had to be relieved of household responsibilities that were thought to be-
come public ones. Employment would free women from forced marriage and depend-
ency on men. This approach in economic policies was also reflected in the legal field,
where pre-communist stipulations discriminating against women were abolished,
such as the legally-determined preponderance of men in all household affairs.
The most obvious result of this commitment was an almost equal participation of
women and men in the labour force and considerable progress in the educational lev-
els of women. Even in the previously most backward south-east European country,
Albania, almost half of all women were employed in 1989.3 In Bulgaria, women ac-
counted for half of the total workforce in 1989, up from 24 per cent before World War
II.4 These increases in employment were linked with dramatic improvements in edu-
cation. Albania is, again, a good example: before the communist takeover, the major-
ity of women were still illiterate. By 1955, illiteracy had been eradicated among all
women (and men) under the age of 40 and, in the 1980s, half of Albania’s university
students were female.5 Political participation of women also increased, as communist
governments pursued policies aimed at raising the number of women deputies at the
local and national levels. Women’s organisations in the framework of the communist
political system also emerged and were supposed to be concerned with women’s is-
sues.
However, much of the progress under communism remained ambiguous and vola-
tile, or even contradictory. Proclamations of gender equality never corresponded to
social reality. Patriarchal values and structures were not eradicated, but the ‘family pa-
triarch’ was replaced by the authoritarian state.6 The emancipation of women did not
aim at enhancing women’s individuality and increasing their choices, but placed
women’s rights and duties firmly in the public sphere of work and politics. Women
were thought to be liberated in order to give them the opportunity to contribute to
2 UNICEF (1999): Women in Transition, Florence: UNICEF (The MONEE Project: Re-
gional Monitoring Report, No. 6), p. iii.
3 Fatos Tarifa (1998): “Disappearing from Politics (Albania)”, in Marilyn Rueschemeyer
(ed.): Women in the Politics of Postcommunist Eastern Europe, Armonk, NY and London:
M. E. Sharp, p. 269.
4 Dobrinka Kostova (1998): “Women in Postcommunist Bulgaria”, in Rueschemeyer
(1998), op. cit., p. 251.
5 Tarifa (1998), op. cit., p. 269ff.
6 Eva Kreisky (ed.) (1996): Vom Patriarchalen Staatssozialismus zur Patriarchalen
Demokratie, Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, p. 11.
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building socialism, implying emancipation was not an end in itself, but an instrument
for wider political goals, as defined by the party. Aside of this, the commitment to
bring women into formal employment also stemmed from the increased demand for
labour due to rapid industrialisation and bureaucratisation.
However, women were not only praised as workers, but also as mothers. From the
1960s, governments in Romania and Bulgaria were putting increasing emphasis on
the ‘foremost and natural’ role of women; that is, to give birth to children, due to con-
cerns over declining birthrates. Women were thus burdened with the ‘duty’ of enlarg-
ing the socialist nation. In the case of Romania, pro-natalist policies became ex-
tremely repressive and caused much psychological and physiological damage to
women.7
In some respects, communist gender-policies even laid the ground for future dis-
crimination against women after the break down of communism. Probably the most
obvious failure was that the private domain remained virtually untouched, despite the
increased significance of women in public. Nearly all women worked outside the
home, and had families at the same time, so most of them had to carry the ‘double
burden’ of homework and employment. This double burden was aggravated by the
common scarcity of goods, and also the insufficiency of public facilities for childcare.
It was generally assumed that women would have primary responsibility for providing
the household with necessary goods, including childcare. Therefore, women had to
bear a greater total workload than men; data from Yugoslavia (1965) and Bulgaria
(1988) suggest that the total workload of women averaged 60 to 70 hours per week, of
which 20 to 30 hours were unpaid work. In Italy, for example, a country with a total
workload for women well above the west European average – in particular as regards
unpaid work – women had to work about 56 hours in 1980; in West Germany and the
UK, the weekly workload of women amounted to around 54 in the 1960s.8
The division of labour also retained a gendered character, although women were
to be found in traditionally ‘male’ occupations such as bricklayer or driver. However,
most women were active in specific sectors, such as education, healthcare, social wel-
fare, and the textile and shoe industries, etc. These jobs were graded lower in prestige
and social status, and – more importantly – they were to be particularly affected by
the transition. Aside of this, few women held managerial and leadership positions in
industry and the professions.
Also, politically, the emancipation of women was superficial rather than genuine.
In nearly all the countries of south-east Europe, few women advanced beyond mid-
level positions. They accounted for from one-fifth to one-third of the members of par-
liaments, but very few women were to be found in the Central Committees and Polit-
buros where real political power was wielded. Aside of this, representatives in parlia-
7 For the case of Romania see the excellent study of Gail Kligman (1998): The Politics of
Duplicity. Controlling Reproduction in Ceaușescu’s Romania, Berkeley, Los Angeles and
London: California University Press.
8 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 25.
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ments were appointed and not genuinely elected, and had no power. High rates of
female participation in ‘elected’ bodies were, therefore, cosmetic:
The ideological promise of gender equality under communism went unfulfilled.9
In some cases, the proportion of women in the Central Committee of the respec-
tive communist party, where real decisions were taken, even declined. In Romania, for
example, during the 1950s the proportion of women in parliament rose to 17 per cent,
whereas in the Central Committee it declined from 7 to 4 per cent.10 In Romania, as
elsewhere, women also tended to cluster at the bottom of any hierarchy.
In the case of Romania, the particular promotion of women in powerful organs of
party and state during the 1970s and 1980s backfired after the end of communism, be-
cause it was to become associated with the hated couple of Nicolae and Elena
Ceaușescu (the “Elena-Ceaușescu-Syndrome” as one scholar called it11). But emanci-
pation and, in particular, feminism, became contaminated concepts also in other post-
communist countries. Besides, many women had been promoted against their will,
which had added another ‘burden’ to their already burdened life. They saw transition
also as a chance to retreat to private life and as an opportunity for individual choice.
Concluding, women were in a weak situation to face the dramatic changes caused
by the dissolution of communist rule, because they lacked political as well as social
and economic resources to defend or improve their position.
3. The ‘domestication’ of women after 1989
Many indicators point to the deterioration in the social, political and health status of
women in south-east Europe, as well as in the other European post-socialist transition
countries after 1989. This is also true for men in several regards, but women have,
nevertheless, been confronted with specific challenges. The general feature is that
women have been rather the objects than the agents of change, which is linked to the
pressure on women throughout the region to retreat from public life. This process,
which I want to call ‘domestication’, has political, social and economic consequences
which will be dealt with in the sections below. It is, moreover, enhanced by deliberate
policies to re-define the role of women and force them again to play traditional roles.
3.1. Political representation
One of the most striking changes brought about by the transition was the dramatic de-
cline in female representation in elected assemblies. Quotas for women were abol-
ished and many fewer women were placed on party lists for elections. A high percent-
9 ibid., p. 93.
10 Mary Ellen Fischer (1998): “From Tradition and Ideology to Elections and Competition.
The Changing Status of Women in Romanian Politics”, in Rueschemeyer, op. cit., p.
172.)
11 Ute Gabanyi (1998): “Rumäniens Frauen nach der Wende: Fortschritt, Gleichschritt,
Rückschritt?”, Südosteuropa, Vol. 47, No. 5-6.
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age of female representatives is not, of course, tantamount to women-friendly
policies, as the communist example proved. And women in powerful positions need
not automatically pursue feminist issues. However, the experience, especially of the
Nordic countries, shows that women’s priorities and concerns are more likely to be
addressed if women make up a sizeable proportion (a ‘critical mass’) of decision-
making bodies. The virtual absence of women from elected bodies in south-east Eu-
rope therefore points to the contrary.
The token representation of women in communist parliaments came to an end im-
mediately after the Wende (see also Table 1: Percentage of women in politics). In
Croatia, only three women were among the 80 delegates in the first multiparty Sobor,
while the last communist Sobor had been made up of 16 per cent female representa-
tives. After 1990, the proportion slightly rose although without passing the 10 per cent
threshold.12 In another particularly nationalist country, Serbia, only 1.6 per cent of all
members of parliament were women between 1990 and 1993.13 In Slovenia, only 10
per cent of delegates in the first multi-party parliament were women.14 Only five
women made it into the first multi-party parliament in Macedonia, which had 120
deputies. Four women were elected to the Macedonian parliament and nine in 1998.15
In Romania, the first multi-party parliament had 13 women out of a total of 383 dele-
gates; in the upper chamber, the Senat, one woman faced 116 men.16 Six years later,
the percentage of women has doubled in both chambers, but is still far below the pre-
1989 level. In Bulgaria, women accounted for only 8.8 per cent of all delegates to the
“Great National Assembly”, elected in 1990 in order to pass a new Constitution,
whereas their proportion had been 21 per cent in the last communist assembly. There-
after, the figure rose only slightly to nine per cent in 1997.17 In Albania, the percent-
age of female delegates dropped from 29.2 per cent in the last communist parliament
to 3.6 per cent in 1991, and 2.8 per cent one year later.18 Since then, the increase in fe-
male representation has been all but impressive. The only country with a sort of gen-
der quota is Bosnia-Herzegovina, where provisions to promote female participation in
parliament were introduced in 1998. As a result, the share of women in the Federa-
tion’s parliament rose from 2 per cent in 1996 to 26 per cent in 1998.19
12 Jill Irvine (1998): “Public Opinion and the Political Position of Women in Croatia”, in
Rueschemeyer (1998), op. cit., p. 215.
13 Žarana Papić (1999): “Women in Serbia: Post-Communism, War and Nationalist Muta-
tions”, in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.): Gender politics in the Western Balkans: Women and So-
ciety in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press, p. 164.
14 Silva Mežnarić and Mirjana Ule (1998): “The Case of Slovenia”, in Rueschemeyer
(1998), op. cit., p. 203.
15 UNDP Macedonia: The Status of Women in Macedonia, at: http://www.undp.org.mk/
womenin.htm, p. 11.
16 Gabanyi (1998), op. cit., p. 254.
17 Kostova (1998), op. cit., p. 256.
18 Tarifa (1998), op. cit., p. 282.
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Table 1: Percentage of women in politics
Notes: a 1996 b FR Yugoslavia c Refers to sub-ministerial level
Sources: Kostova (1998), p. 256; Tarifa (1998), p. 282; Gabanyi (1998), p. 254; Mežnarić & Ule
(1998), p. 203; Irvine (1998), p. 215; Papić (1999), p. 164; UNDP (1999a), p. 66; UNDP (1999b),
pp. 142-143.
Women are also under-represented at the regional and local levels, although
women face fewer problems in entering local as opposed to national politics. How-
ever, only a few mayors are women; around 10 per cent in Bulgaria and 2 per cent in
Romania. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia there are no women
mayors at all. In Bulgaria, women amounted to 21 per cent of delegates on local coun-
cils in 1995, while in Romania the figure was just six per cent, which points also to
significant differences between the countries of the region.20 Five women face 20 men
in Skopje’s city council, and the share of women among local municipal councillors is
around six per cent in Macedonia.21
The low level of political representation further enhances the neglect of women’s
issues by most parties. Parties on their own discriminate against women, as their rep-
resentation on party executive committees is invariably less than their share of the
membership. In Slovenia, for example, women constitute 60 per cent of the member-
ship of the Christian Democrats, but less than 20 per cent of the leadership posi-
tions.22 The share of women in non-elected high government posts is also very low.
Women as ministers are still rare (see Table 1: Percentage of women in politics). In
19 UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999): Human Development Report 1998, Sarajevo:
UNDP, at: http://www.undp.com.ba/hdr/engleski/pdf/hdr-eng.pdf, p. 99.
Country
First multi-
party par-
liament
Parliament Cabinet Vice-minis-
ters
Municipal 
Councils
as of 
February 
1999
as of June 1998
Albania 3.6 11.0 5.0 5.0 1.0
Bulgaria 8.8 10.8 18.0 24.0 25.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina – 6.9 0.0a 4.6c 6.2
Croatia 3.75 7.2 0.5 20.0 –
Rep. of Macedonia 4.2 7.5 10.0 18.2 –
Romania 3.4 5.6 0.0a 4.1c –
Serbia (as part of FRY) 1.6 4.0 5.9b 8.7bc –
Slovenia 10.0 7.8 9.1a 36.8 10.8
20 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 101.
21 UNDP Macedonia, op. cit., p. 13.
22 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 96.
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1996, only 13.2 per cent of senior government posts were occupied by women in the
countries of the Former Yugoslavia, as were just 9.9 per cent of such posts in the rest
of the region.23 Evidence from Macedonia also points to a very low representation of
women in higher levels of the judiciary, such as supreme courts.24
The political under-representation of women is caused by several factors: first of
all, most parties share a distaste for active emancipation policies, and gender equality
is not regarded as important for the legitimisation of the new liberal-democratic re-
gimes – and, of course, even less so as far as nationalist regimes are concerned. Quo-
tas for women concerning political representation are generally shunned because they
are associated with the communist past. Aside of this, women entered the realm of
post-communist politics with less resources for the political struggle. Political net-
works of ex-communists, as well as of former dissidents, consisted mainly of men. In
many cases, male-dominated party leaderships also believed that female candidates
would diminish the odds of their party in elections, although evidence from Mace-
donia points to the fact that voters do not have gender-based preferences concerning
candidates.25 Women, therefore, seem more likely to organise themselves outside po-
litical parties in various NGOs. The NGO sector is, in turn, becoming more and more
interested in activities which aim at the larger involvement of women in politics and
society, and at solving their immediate problems.
The reluctance of women to involve themselves in politics also results from the
experience of communist promotion and its adverse affects. Economic constraints, re-
duced social security and the pressure to carry out the time-consuming tasks of home-
making and childcare do not leave many women enough time to engage themselves in
politics. Finally, many men, but also women, simply believe that a woman’s place is
in the kitchen rather than in the parliament.
3.2. Employment
The change in the economic situation of women must be seen against the background
of the general decline in economic output during the transition. GDP dropped by 35
per cent and more during the first half of the 1990s, and has recovered its 1989 level
only in Slovenia. In all other countries, GDP is still substantially lower than in 1989.
The decline in GDP has been accompanied by the loss of millions of jobs, leading to
high unemployment. Many unemployed people have found work in the growing
shadow economy, but these unregistered jobs do not entitle their holders either to so-
cial security benefits or to the protection of the labour laws. As a result of the decline
in economic activity and formal employment, revenues of governments have also
been reduced, diminishing their possibilities to intervene in the social and economic
fabric. Most of the efforts of the former communist regimes to support female em-
ployment were linked to generous social security benefits, rights of return after mater-
23 ibid., p. 97.
24 UNDP Macedonia, op. cit., p. 12.
25 ibid., p. 16.
Ulf Brunnbauer
158 South-East Europe Review 3/2000
nity leave and public facilities for childcare, and so the reduction in public expendi-
ture must have had adverse effects on the economic situation of women.
The decline in women’s economic status is best illustrated by the reduction in fe-
male employment. In several countries, women were more likely to become unem-
ployed and had more difficulties in finding new jobs (see the examples of Bulgaria in
Table 2 and Romania in Table 3). In Romania, 13.5 per cent of women and 9.1 per
cent of men were unemployed in 1994.26 In the Republic of Macedonia, women
amounted in 1997 to 38 per cent of all employees, but 45.1 per cent of those who were
unemployed.27 The unemployment rates of women were not higher than those of men
in all countries, but this can partly be explained by the official unemployment statis-
tics counting only those who register as such. Those – mostly women – who com-
pletely withdraw from the labour market are not officially regarded as ‘unemployed’.
The gender gap in crude activity rates (that is male minus female rates) has, thus, risen
throughout the region.28 In particular, women raising small children, as well as older
women, have problems in the more competitive labour market.
Table 2: Unemployment in Bulgaria by gender
26 Gabanyi (1998), op. cit., p. 239.
27 UNDP Macedonia, op. cit., pp. 26, 28.
28 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 25.
Men Women
Total unemployment (in thousands)
1991 191 228
1992 275 302
1993 298 328
1994 223 265
1995 188 236
1996 215 263
1997 236 287
By duration (1995, in percentages)
Under one year 35.8 31.6
One year or more 63.4 68.0
By age (1995, in percentages)
Up to 29 40.4 39.2
30-54 46.1 51.1
Rate of employment (November 1997, in percentages)
Economically active 56.7 46.8
Employed 48.4 39.7
Unemployed 14.7 15.3
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Source: Transitions (1995), Vol. 5, No. 1, January, p. 15; Statističeski godišnik na Republika
Bălgarija (1998), Sofia: NSI, p. 81.
Table 3: Female/male comparisons in post-communist Romania
Source: UNDP Romania (1996), p. 101.
Minority women – especially from the large Roma minorities, but also Muslim
women in non-Muslim countries – face particular problems in finding employment.
They are also often discouraged to seek such by their own communities, which pursue
strong patriarchal values.
Poverty and unemployment have forced many women to the very margins of soci-
ety, where tens of thousands of the most desperate end up in prostitution. Young
women are especially vulnerable, and are often forced into prostitution and sold into
virtual slavery in west European brothels.
Aside of falling rates of employment, women are also faced with gender gaps in
pay as a result of gender-based occupational segregation. As in most countries around
the globe, women are clustered in lower-paying, lower-status occupations and are not
equally represented in senior and decision-making positions (see the example of
Croatia in Table 4). The economic sectors in which women have predominated under
communism are still characterised by state-run enterprises, for example public health,
education, science, and information and culture. In the Republic of Macedonia, for
example, two-fifths of all female employment is in health care, education and public
administration.29 In these sectors, salaries are lower than in others and are often de-
layed, or there have been large staff reductions and budget cuts due to austerity poli-
cies.30 In general, the rate of movement of women from public sector to private sector
jobs has been slower than that of men.31 Aside from this, many women are employed
in low-qualified, export-oriented industrial occupations such as the textile industry
and shoe making,32 in which many jobs have been cut due to restructuring, privatisa-
tion and shrinking export opportunities.
Females as percentage of males
Life expectancy at birth, 1992-1994 111
Mean years of schooling, 1995 88
Secondary enrolment, 1994-95 102
Post-secondary enrolment 93
Employment, 1994 87
Unemployment, 1995 123
29 ibid., p. 30.
30 UNDP (1999a): Transition 1999. Human Development Report for Europe and the CIS.
New York: UNDP, p. 70.
31 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 31.
32 Johanna Deimel (1995): “Die Stellung der Frau in Bulgarien”, Südosteuropa, Vol. 44, No.
3-4, p. 152.
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Table 4: The composition of employees according to occupation and sex in
Croatia (June 1997)
Source: UNDP (1999a), p. 71.
As a result of these processes, the gender gap in pay has risen throughout the re-
gion, albeit not dramatically, and it is still comparable, or even smaller, than in west-
ern countries. In Slovenia, for example, female monthly wages amounted to 87.0 per
cent of male ones in 1987, and 85.4 per cent in 1996. In Bulgaria, a drop from 74.0 to
69.1 per cent was recorded in the ratio of female to male wages between 1990 and
1997.33
Women’s loss of formal employment has occurred despite their educational
achievements being comparable to, or even better than, those of men. In Macedonia,
for instance, 51.6 per cent of all university students are women.34 But women appear
to be particularly vulnerable to the macroeconomic and social changes brought about
by transition. They have, for example, to face the consequences of the erosion of so-
cial services much more than do men. Many women are forced to concentrate on the
upbringing of their children, as state- and enterprise-run childcare facilities either be-
come too expensive or are closed down. In particular, nurseries for children under two
or three years have been closed and, as a consequence, enrolment rates have de-
clined.35 Rights of return after maternity leave have in many cases become illusory, as
the state lacks the capability to impose them on private employers. Part-time employ-
ment, which would allow women to balance their roles as care-givers and breadwin-
Occupation Percentage of women in re-
lation to men
Percentage of all women in 
each occupation
Heads of government bodies and 
managers
28.9 0.9
Experts and scientists 48.8 10.3
Engineers and technicians 52.3 15.3
Office and desk clerks 69.6 20.7
Services and sales 61.6 18.6
Agriculture and related 71.0 12.4
Craft occupations and individual 
manufacture
17.0 6.5
Operators of machines, vehicles 
etc.
26.7 4.0
Low-skilled occupations 55.0 10.7
All occupations 49.6 100.0
33 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 33.
34 UNDP Macedonia, op. cit., p. 9.
35 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 55.
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ners, is still rather uncommon in the region. Moreover, wages are generally so meagre
that part-time work is often not a viable alternative. Early marriages of women and
early childbirths also interrupt their formal education and withdraw them from the
broader process of decision-making in society.36
Many women, therefore, lose important job experience and are not treated by em-
ployers as equal to men. An ILO survey in Bulgaria during 1991-93 found out that
employers usually select men and pay them a higher salary.37 Private enterprises also
regard women as potentially more expensive labour because of maternity leave and
their right to return, while they are looking for the cheapest available labour in order
to maximise profits. Women are thus less likely to be private-sector employees. How-
ever, they are also less likely to be self-employed or entrepreneurs. In the FR Yugosla-
via, Bulgaria and Romania, the share of women among entrepreneurs amounted to 23-
26 per cent in 1997,38 although this is, however, consistent with their share in western
market economies. The biggest problem for women in starting up their own busi-
nesses is the lack of access to credit and, closely related to that, the lack of ‘symbolic’
capital in the sense of informal networks, contacts and patrons. Against all the odds,
women do try to establish themselves in private business and, in particular, the thriv-
ing NGO sector provides many career opportunities for women. But these women, as
are many others who are employees, face an increased ‘double’ or ‘triple’ burden be-
cause they have to spend much time on household tasks, a problem aggravated by the
lack of mechanisation and automatisation of homemaking.39
3.3. Values and Roles
However, women’s loss of political and economic status is not only an unavoidable
by-product of transition, but also the result of the deliberate choices which have to be
made despite all the economic constraints. These choices reflect to a large extent ex-
isting power relations between the genders in politics, as well as notions about the
roles of men and women in society.
South-east Europe is regarded as a region in which patriarchal values have tradi-
tionally been dominant and which were not completely eradicated by communism. Ap-
parently, the transition crisis, which has resulted in a loss of security in many walks of
life, has led to a strengthening of old role models and values. The breakdown of com-
munism is frequently associated with a moral vacuum and crisis. To overcome this cri-
sis and to achieve a healthy society, many – especially on the right – argue that family
and other traditional values must be strengthened, assigning men to the public life of
work and politics, and women to the private life of housework and motherhood.40 Fem-
36 UNDP Macedonia, op. cit., p. 4.
37 UNDP (1999a), op. cit., p. 70.
38 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 103.
39 UNDP (1999a), op. cit., p. 72ff.
40 Wendy Bracewell (1996): “Women in the Transition to Democracy in South-Eastern Eu-
rope”, in Mient Jan Faber (ed.): The Balkans. A Religious Backyard of Europe, Ravenna:
Longo Editore, p. 217.
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inist movements are claimed to be ‘immoral’, or traitors to the nation, including in Slo-
venia and, particularly, in Croatia and Serbia, where conservative governments after
1990 have waged campaigns against feminist activists.41 In Slovenia and Croatia, the
Catholic church has also put pressure on women to return to traditional family norms.
In both countries, the church has pushed for the abolition of abortion, albeit without
much success because the populations have been against such restrictions. In Slovenia,
the anti-abortion struggle of the church, and the conflicts over ‘reproductive rights’, un-
wittingly contributed to a rise in female political activism.42 In the mainly Orthodox
countries of south-east Europe, the church has had less influence on public matters, al-
though it has also tried to facilitate traditional role models.
There are opposing forces, such as reformed communists, social democrats and
liberals, which, to some extent, emphasise gender equality. But, due to poor female
political representation, neither do political groups regard women’s issues as para-
mount ones.
The severest cultural backlash has occurred in countries ruled by nationalist re-
gimes in which:
Genders are divided as naturalized sexes in order to make them complementary agents of the
Nation.43
In nationalist discourse and politics, women are mainly defined by their role in the
biological and cultural reproduction of the nation, and become ‘mothers of the na-
tion’. Women are not seen as individuals in their own right, but as instruments for the
higher ideals of the national collective, quite similar to the discourse in socialism.
This notion was particularly dominant in war-afflicted countries for, in war, women:
Can only be a wife of the dead hero, or a mother of the dead hero, or a daughter of the dead
hero.44
Nationalist movements aim at controlling women’s sexuality in order to enlarge
the nation. In Croatia, the church’s campaign against abortion was supported by the
government because, “The ruling party [was attempting] to increase the Croat popula-
tion”.45 In Slovenia, the platform of the DEMOS coalition stated in 1991 that,
“Women should not have the right to abort future defenders of the nation”.46 The Ser-
bian patriarch, in turn, demanded that the government fight what he called the “White
41 Tatjana Pavlović (1999): “Women in Croatia: Feminists, Nationalists and Homosexuals”,
in Ramet (1999), op. cit., p. 136; Branka Andjelković (1998): “Reflections on National-
ism and Its Impact on Women in Serbia”, in Rueschemeyer (1998), op. cit., pp. 235-248.
42 Pavlović (1999), op. cit., p. 131; Irvine (1998), op. cit., p. 224; Mežnarić & Ule (1998),
op. cit., p. 210; Vlasta Jalušić  (1999): “Women in Post-Socialist Slovenia: Socially
Adapted, Politically Marginalized”, in Ramet (1999), op. cit., p. 117ff.
43 Papić (1999), op. cit., p. 159.
44 Pavlović (1999), op. cit., p. 142.
45 Irvine (1998), op. cit., p. 224.
46 Quoted in Bracewell (1996), op. cit., p. 215.
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Plague”, i.e. declining birth rates. Serbian women were also urged to enter into a “fer-
tility war” against Albanian women, whose fertility was considerably higher.47 On the
other hand, the Serbian regime tried to curtail birth rates among Albanians by repres-
sive administrative measures.
3.4. Violence, Health and Reproduction
Male attempts to control female sexuality are also reflected in an upsurge of violence
against women. In the Yugoslav wars, women were particularly affected by violence.
Mass rape was a deliberate part of warfare in the Bosnian war during 1992-1995,
when an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 women, representing 1-2 per cent of the total pre-
war female population, were raped.48 The proportion of female civilian casualties, as
well as of women refugees, was also very high. Including the Kosovo conflict, it has
been estimated that women and children account for eight out of ten civilians caught
up in the post-Yugoslav wars.49
However, violence against women has also increased in countries not affected by
war. Most of this violence is domestic and thus often goes unreported. Credible statis-
tical data is therefore hard to grasp, but surveys based on interviews and question-
naires can partly fill the gap. According to a study of the SOS Helpline for Battered
Women and Children in Belgrade, one woman in seven is the victim of rape. In Alba-
nia, a survey in 1995 had 63 per cent of the 850 women interviewed reporting physi-
cal or psychological violence. In Romania, 29 per cent of women treated between
March 1993 and March 1994 in the Bucharest Forensic Hospital had been beaten by
their partner.50
In most countries, national legislation has not yet tackled the problem of domestic
violence, which is usually regarded as a private matter that need not be addressed by
public policies. In Bulgaria, for example, domestic violence against women is not
specifically prohibited. Similarly, the Macedonian penal code outlaws violence
against women (and men), but does not specifically deal with domestic and marital, as
well as other forms of violence, against women.51 Marital rape is not recognised as a
crime in Albania, Croatia, Republic of Macedonia, Romania and FR Yugoslavia.
In Slovenia, domestic physical violence is not considered criminal in cases of ‘light’ injury –
a definition that includes ‘fractured noses, ribs, light contusions and punched-out teeth’.52
Much of domestic violence stems from the unstable economic and social situation,
from rising unemployment, poverty, social exclusion and alcohol misuse. It has be-
come more difficult for women to separate from violent partners due to their financial
47 Papić (1999), op. cit., p. 163.
48 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 85; Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph (1999): “Rape
in War: The Case of Bosnia”, in Ramet (1999), op. cit., pp. 203-218.
49 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 86.
50  ibid., p. 84.
51 UNDP Macedonia, op. cit., p. 25.
52 UNICEF (1999), op. cit., p. 89.
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dependency. Homes for battered women are also scarce throughout the region and the
legal process is often inaccessible for victims of violence due to its high costs. How-
ever, there are also efforts to approach this problem, like the Programme against Vio-
lence of the Bulgarian Women’s Union, which opened the first-ever shelter for bat-
tered women and their children in Bulgaria, or SOS hotlines for women who have
been victimised by men in some cities across the region.
Apart from the psychological and physiological consequences of violence,
women’s health has also deteriorated in other regards. The transition has weakened
the state health system and has caused adverse changes in the socio-economic factors
that shape women’s health, such as income disparity, greater social stress and poverty.
The health record is uneven, within the region as well as by different indicators. For
example, the life expectancy of men and women has grown in some countries; in oth-
ers (Albania and Bulgaria) it has declined for both; while in others (Romania) it has
risen among women but declined among men.53 Maternal mortality rates have also
declined between 1989 and 1997 throughout the region (except in Slovenia and Bul-
garia), but in Romania, Albania and Bulgaria they are still above the WHO target for
Europe of 15 deaths per 100,000 live births.54 In Romania and Albania, the decline in
maternal deaths was mostly a result of the legalisation of abortion. Before 1989 in
both countries, many pregnant women not wishing to give birth resorted to illegal
abortions carried out in unhygienic circumstances which resulted in increased rates of
maternal deaths.
Other aspects of reproductive health, such as pregnancy and birth complications,
have, however, been displaying negative trends since 1989, in particular in the coun-
tries worst hit by the transition (in fact in all of south-east Europe except for Slovenia
and, to some extent also, Croatia). The evidence indicates a decline in the provision of
health services for pregnant women, and also substantial inequalities in access to pre-
and post-natal care by age, education, income and place of residence (rural or urban).
Economic despair, inadequate access to family planning and contraceptives, as well as
the lack of sex education, has also led to high abortion rates which, in the first half of
the 1990s, were sharply rising in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, where abortion had
been forbidden or restricted before 1989. In Romania, six times more abortions were
reported in 1990 than in 1989.
However, since the mid-1990s, abortion rates have been declining in these coun-
tries, and have also been falling in the countries of former Yugoslavia since 1989 (see
Table 5).55 Abortion is often followed by complications, aside of the psychological
damage. The high rates of abortion have strengthened the process of falling fertility
rates which can be observed throughout the region. In the countries of former Yugo-
slavia, the total fertility rate decreased by 10 per cent from 1989 to 1997; in the rest of
south-east Europe, which includes Albania with its traditionally high birth rates, it
53 ibid., p. 12.
54 ibid., p. 60.
55 ibid., p. 63.
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dropped by 41 per cent. Bulgaria, with well under 8 live births per 1,000 inhabitants,
has now one of the lowest birth rates in Europe (see Table 5).
Table 5: Birth-rates and abortions, 1998
Notes: a 1997 b 1996 c 1990 = 100
Source: transMONEE 2000 database
Aside from problems related to pregnancy, lifestyle-related health risks have also
grown. This is related to economic problems, such as lack of medicines and low nutri-
tion levels, as well as to changes in behaviour, especially in young women who are in-
creasingly bridging the gulf with men as regards drinking and smoking.
4. Conclusion
Insufficient attention has been paid to women’s issues by political parties and govern-
ments in the post-communist countries of south-east Europe although, during the
most recent years, a gradual change toward greater assertiveness for specifically fe-
male problems has been noticeable, in particular in countries negotiating membership
with the European Union. South-east European ‘traditional’ values, as well as the
communist legacies, explain much of the current plight of women. However, as simi-
lar processes in central European transition countries prove, the overall development
of women’s status is more determined by the very logic of restructuring toward capi-
talist market economies, regardless of geographic or cultural particularities. Unpaid
female work in the spheres of biological and social reproduction is historically one of
the pillars of capitalism. Consciously or not, the advocates of economic liberalism fa-
cilitate the re-emergence of traditional role models, because they are opposed to regu-
lation and intervention by the state in the economic fabric. The dismantling of the
welfare state affects women more than men, as governments terminate or seriously re-
duce the social benefits that have been intended to bring women into employment.
Without such support, employment for women often becomes illusory.
Country Birth-rate Abortion
per 1000 persons 1989 = 100 Per 100 life births 1989 = 100
Albania 18.1 73.9 31.5 106.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina 10a 66.8a n.a. n.a.
Bulgaria 7.9 62.8 114.8 97.7
Croatia 10.1 86.4 18.9 22.4c
FR Yugoslavia 12.4a 83.9a 61.1b 46.8b
FYR Macedonia 14.6 85.6 41.1 48.5
Romania 10.5 66 114.4 219.6
Slovenia 9 76.7 51 75.4
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Hence the neo-liberal paradigm, which is also opposed to the deliberate promotion
of female political representation, must be abandoned in order to alleviate the plight of
women. Women’s issues have to be seriously considered in public discourse. That,
however, will only be the case if more women participate in decision-making, which
requires some sort of quota systems enhancing the representation of women within the
highest law-giving institution.56 Men’s resistance, as well as women’s reluctance to get
involved in politics, must, therefore, be overcome. Civil society and the NGO sector,
from which, until now, most successful responses against gender inequality have come,
cannot fundamentally change the situation on their own. State efforts, such as affirma-
tive action and specific programmes, are required, and these need to address the politi-
cal, economic, social and educational problems. Micro-credit programmes might also
prove to be very useful in the support of female business activities.
However, the situation in south-east Europe must be put into a comparative per-
spective in order to understand the structural patterns of discrimination against
women. According to several indicators, the situation of women in south-east Europe
now more resembles that of other developed countries than it did before 1989, for ex-
ample as regards the increased differences in the rates of male and female employ-
ment, which is now similar to the levels of western economies (except for the Nordic
countries). Pay gaps between men and women are also not particularly different in
south-east Europe from those in western Europe. As regards political representation,
women in many EU countries are not less under-represented: in France, Italy, Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Portugal and Greece, women were holding well below 15 per
cent of parliament seats as of February, 1999.57 Thus, the transition countries can be
said to come closer to capitalist ‘normality’.
Discrepancies in women’s political, economic, health and social status between
south-east Europe and western countries can mainly be explained by the dramatic
economic constraints with which south-east European societies are confronted, and
also by a certain level of ‘backwardness’ as regards technology and legislation. But, in
addition, there are still positive aspects of the communist legacy at hand, which indi-
cates that the post-communist transition countries do enjoy a gender equality advan-
tage relative to other countries with a similar level of economic development. They
rank, therefore, better in the “Gender-Related Development Index” than in the “Hu-
man Development Index”. This, as well as progress in legal and formal gender equal-
ity, which is already under way, might well serve as starting points for changes also in
the real relationships between the genders toward emancipation and gender equality.
56 See: UNDP Macedonia, op. cit., p. 34.
57 UNDP (1999b): Human Development Report, New York: UNDP, p. 142.
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